8-figureTotal contract value
7-figureAnnual contract value (ACV)

The short version

Because I saw that this Fortune 500 apparel retailer’s Microsoft Dynamics implementation was struggling, and that it had no single view of its guests, I knew the roughly 100-user pilot it was considering would only delay the real decision. I chose to build a case for replacing its CRM across the enterprise, with its Head of Guest Support and its systems integrator, KPMG, rather than compete for the pilot. That led to an 8-figure CRM rip-and-replace in about nine months, Salesforce Retail’s largest CRM deal of the year, and a #1 finish for me at 230% of quota in FY24. Instead of a pilot that would have put a third CRM next to Oracle and Microsoft, the customer got one platform for every guest interaction.

The obvious deal vs. the deal I built

The pilot was real, and it was the easier path. But it would have pushed the real decision back about a year, let the customer avoid the question of renewing Dynamics, and added a third CRM to a stack already built on Oracle and Microsoft. The customer had bought Dynamics after a formal RFP about 18 months before I owned the account, and its systems integrator leaned toward Microsoft.

This deal followed the four milestones of my Strategic Deal Roadmap: early alignment, go wide then deep, a defendable business case, and executive commitment with a team that can deliver.

Milestone 1: Early alignment

I saw an account everyone had written off. The customer had run an RFP and chosen Dynamics before the account was mine. Other account directors told me it was a waste of time.

I decided to treat it as mine to find and source anyway. I didn’t wait for an inbound request. I built my own view of the business the way its guests experience it, in stores, online and when something goes wrong, and went looking for where the current system was falling short.

Because a “no” from 18 months ago is a decision about a different moment. Early conversations showed the Dynamics implementation was not delivering, with about 18 months left on the contract. That was the opening: not a pitch against a competitor, but a renewal decision the customer would have to make either way.

Milestone 2: Go wide, then deep

I saw two things working against me. KPMG, the systems integrator, leaned toward Microsoft. And the customer was leaning toward the small pilot, the safest choice for everyone involved and the one most likely to stall.

I decided to offer neutral proof instead of arguing. I set up a breakfast with the Head of Guest Support and our Regional Vice President to listen, not to present. I invested in KPMG the way I would invest in my own team, so they could see what an end-to-end platform would mean for the customer. And we ran workshops and built capability maps across guest support, stores and digital before going deep on any one workflow.

Because when the integrator leans the other way, you don’t fight them. You give them the facts to make their own recommendation. Going wide is also where the scope changed: the gap was not one team’s case management. It was the whole company’s view of its guests.

Milestone 3: Make the business case defendable

I saw that without a unified view of the guest, the business was paying for it in several places at once. Fraudulent returns carried a material cost, measured in the nine figures. Educators on the store floor could not see a guest’s history. And the CEO cared about the digital guest experience, which depended on the same missing data.

I decided to make the Head of Guest Support the mobilizer and build the case with them, not for them. Together we turned a pilot conversation into an enterprise case that tied the platform to the problems executives already owned: returns, the store experience and digital growth.

Because a pilot answers a small question. The business case answered the one the CEO was already asking, in the customer’s own terms, with a sponsor who could defend it in rooms I would never be in.

Milestone 4: Executive commitment, and a team that can deliver

I saw doubt on both sides. Inside Salesforce, leadership doubted the deal could close in the fiscal year. Inside the customer, nobody wanted to pay for two CRMs while the Dynamics contract ran out.

I decided three things. First, design the commercials around the customer’s reality: staggered activations and a ramp, so the customer was not double-paying while it moved off the old system. Second, arm the sponsor and KPMG with what they needed to carry the decision through their own executive approvals, including a delivery plan the integrator stood behind. Third, run the final roughly 90 days of negotiation myself, so every open question had one owner and a next step.

Because executives commit when the plan removes their risk, not when the price looks good. A structure that matched the contract timeline, and a team ready to deliver it, turned “not this year” into a signature in the fiscal year.

The result

The deal closed in FY24, about nine months after I sourced it, at an 8-figure total contract value and a seven-figure incremental annual contract value. It was Salesforce Retail’s largest CRM deal of the year, and it helped me finish #1 at 230% of quota. The relationship then grew into a broader guest-experience program, including conversational AI and voice. Commercial terms remain confidential.

A pilot answers a small question. Executives buy the answer to the big one.

How I’d run this play for AI and platform buyers

Retailers today are deciding which AI agents and platforms will talk to their guests, and most have never bought anything like it. The obvious deal is a support chatbot sold as ticket deflection, scoped as a pilot that never has to answer the bigger question. The bigger deal is the growth problem behind it: knowing every guest across stores, digital and support, cutting the cost of returns and making every interaction worth more. The same four milestones apply: own the account others have written off, see the whole business before scoping a pilot, build the case with a mobilizer who owns the problem, and structure the commitment so executives can say yes without taking on new risk.


Adapted from my deal account and career records. Customer unnamed and described only as a Fortune 500 apparel retailer. Contract values are self-reported and shown as figure bands rather than exact amounts. The 230% of quota, #1 finish and “largest CRM deal of the year” statements are self-reported. These are contract values, not a claim of downstream customer ROI.